Russia's decision to support a UN resolution on Syria was more about
its comfort with the wording of the text then it was a shift in Kremlin
policy.After a few months of intense deliberation, the United Nations Security Council managed to reach an agreement in the ongoing Syrian conflict. It embraced former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s peace plan, which calls for the negotiation of a ceasefire between government and opposition forces, the beginning of a process of political transition, and guaranteed delivery of humanitarian aid to refugees and other victims of the violence. While the statement does not have the power of a formal Security Council resolution, it is a significant step forward. Russia’s agreement to its terms is particularly interesting, as it seems to represent a marked shift away from the country’s original stanch stand against any resolution on the Syrian conflict. So why was this negotiation strategy successful in wooing Russia when others were not? The difference is that, this time around, the talks took into consideration Russian interests, the complexities of intercultural negotiations, and Russian negotiation behaviour, addressing those issues within the text of the resolution.
A major obstacle to negotiations is the fact that different parties can interpret signed agreements in different ways. Kevin Avruch and Zheng Wang used the distinction between “text” and “context” to explain, for instance, how cultural and linguistic differences were the main obstacles in the American-Chinese apology agreement following the jet collusion incident in 2001. This becomes even more complicated when the same words communicate different meanings in different languages and cultures. To overcome cross-cultural boundaries, a text should address the nuances in those meanings while speaking to the interests – the context – of each party.
Bridging over intercultural differences becomes even more difficult when dealing with Russia, given typical Russian negotiation behaviour. In his book, Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition, Jerrold Schecter describes the elements of Russian negotiation as, “suspicion of the outside world, obsequiousness to authority, and an aggressive, mistrustful and cynical approach toward negotiations.” Add to this suspicious nature the fact that the vague wording of the recent resolution on Libya resulted in disaster, and it’s easy to understand why Russia may have questioned the “real” purpose of the Syrian resolution: Only a few months earlier, the text of Resolution 1973 allowed the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya, which, as we know, turned into a limited western military intervention and a chaotic post-war order. As a result, Russia likely feared that the language in the first resolution on Syria allowed for a similar western crusade.
The Russians are averse to the prospect of an intervention that leaves the country as a lawless fertile ground for radical Islamist movements. Unlike in Libya, an uncontrolled civil war in Syria could easily deteriorate the stability of the entire region due to Syria’s strategic location and position within the Iranian-Hezbollah alliance. As different as it may seem, the memories of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan remain fresh in the minds of Russian decision-makers who wish to avoid similar adventures or endanger stable Russian interests in the Middle East.
Once we recognize the geo-political context informing Russia’s negotiation behaviour, we can see that, to reach an agreement, it was necessary to satisfy the Russians by using clear, unambiguous text that allayed their suspicion and mistrust. Importantly for the Russians, Kofi Annan’s peace plan does not mention any option for foreign military intervention (though it does leave the option open for “further steps” to be taken if this agreement fails). Moreover, it emphasizes the recognition of the UN special envoy (Kofi Annan) as the international authority to negotiate with the Syrian government, unlike the Libyan resolution, which allowed member states to take action in case of incompliance, eventually leading to a western-led NATO operation.
Despite western attempts to depict Russia’s behaviour as immoral and unwilling, the Russians never claimed to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s actions or his staying in rule. It is no secret that Russia has economic interests in Syria, but there is more to consider in this situation. With Vladimir Putin re-elected as Russia’s president (and maybe less inclined to strengthen his image as an imperialistic defiant), a compromise that addresses the interests of all parties and overlaps intercultural differences has been achieved by supporting Kofi Annan’s statement. The success of this negotiation proves that understanding the basics of a country’s negotiation behaviour and the importance of context and interpretation to the wording of a text are critical to finding agreement in the international community. Keeping this in mind will make it easier to reach a future agreement should Assad’s horrendous killing continue.
Original Article
Source: the mark news
Author: Arik Segal
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